

# PHIL 201 2019

Knowledge and Reality

View Online



---

Adam Elga. (2007). Reflection and Disagreement. *Noûs*, 41(3).  
[https://www.jstor.org/stable/4494542?seq=1#metadata\\_info\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4494542?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)

Can Wikipedia ever make the grade. (n.d.).  
[https://www.nku.edu/~ocallaght/courses/601/wikipedia\\_art3.pdf](https://www.nku.edu/~ocallaght/courses/601/wikipedia_art3.pdf)

Chapter 2: Brains in a Vat, Hilary Putnam. (1999). In *Skepticism*. Oxford University Press.  
Coady, D. & Ebooks Corporation. (2012a). Chapter 1 of *What to Believe Now (Introduction)*.  
In *What to believe now: applying epistemology to contemporary issues*. Wiley-Blackwell.  
<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/vuw/detail.action?docID=844010>

Coady, D. & Ebooks Corporation. (2012b). Chapter 2 of *What to believe now: applying epistemology to contemporary issues (Experts and the Laity)*. In *What to believe now: applying epistemology to contemporary issues*. Wiley-Blackwell.  
<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/vuw/detail.action?docID=844010>

Coady, D. & Ebooks Corporation. (2012c). Chapter 5 of *What to believe now: applying epistemology to contemporary issues (Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorists)*. In *What to believe now: applying epistemology to contemporary issues*. Wiley-Blackwell.  
<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/vuw/detail.action?docID=844010>

Coady, D. & Ebooks Corporation. (2012d). Chapter of 6 *What to believe now: applying epistemology to contemporary issues (The Blogosphere and the Conventional Media)*. In *What to believe now: applying epistemology to contemporary issues*. Wiley-Blackwell.  
<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/vuw/detail.action?docID=844010>

Dare, T. (2014). Disagreement Over Vaccination Programmes: Deep Or Merely Complex and Why Does It Matter? *HEC Forum*, 26(1), 43–57.  
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s10730-013-9227-z>

Feinberg, J., & Shafer-Landau, R. (2013). Chisholm, 'The Problem of the Criterion' (pages 168-173). In *Reason and responsibility: readings in some basic problems of philosophy (Fifteenth edition)*. Wadsworth.

Fred Feldman. (2006). 13. Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement. In *Epistemology Futures*. Oxford University Press, Incorporated.  
<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/vuw/reader.action?docID=422899&ppg=227>

Herbert A. Simon, Patrick W. Langley and Gary L. Bradshaw. (1981). *Scientific Discovery as Problem Solving*. *Synthese*, 47(1).  
[https://www.jstor.org/stable/20115615?seq=1#metadata\\_info\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20115615?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)

Hetherington, S. C. (1996a). 14. Externalism. In *Knowledge puzzles: an introduction to epistemology*. Westview Press.

Hetherington, S. C. (1996b). 15. Internalism. In *Knowledge puzzles: an introduction to epistemology*. Westview Press.

Kihyeon Kim. (1993). Internalism and Externalism in Epistemology. *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 30(4).

[https://www.jstor.org/stable/20014469?seq=1#metadata\\_info\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/20014469?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)

Meheus, J., & Nickles, T. (1999). Deductive and ampliative adaptive logics as tools in the study of creativity. *Foundations of Science*, 4(3), 231–235.

<https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009663506333>

Moore, G. E. (1959). *Philosophical papers*. Allen & Unwin.

Naturalism in Epistemology. (n.d.).

<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-naturalized/>

Olsson, E. J. (2011). The Value of Knowledge. *Philosophy Compass*, 6(12), 874–883.

<https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2011.00425.x>

Peter D. Klein. (1999). Human Knowledge and the Infinite Regress of Reasons. *Philosophical Perspectives*, 13.

[https://www.jstor.org/stable/2676107?seq=1#metadata\\_info\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/2676107?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)

Plato. (2000). *The Meno*. In *Meno*. Infomotions, Inc.

<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/vuw/reader.action?docID=3314610&ppg=1#>

Pritchard, D. (2016). Epistemic Externalism and Internalism. In *Epistemology* (pp. 77–91).

Palgrave Macmillan UK. [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-52692-2\\_5](https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-137-52692-2_5)

Robert Audi. (2010). 7 Testimony: The Social Foundation of Knowledge. In *Epistemology : A Contemporary Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge*. Routledge.

<https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/vuw/reader.action?docID=574520&ppg=36>

SCHICKORE, JUTTA., & STEINLE, FRIEDRICH. (Eds.). (2006). Chapter: Context of Discovery vs Context of Justification. In *Revisiting Discovery and Justification: Historical and philosophical perspectives on the context distinction* (Vol. 14). Springer Netherlands.

<https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007%2F1-4020-4251-5>

Science and Pseudo-Science. (n.d.). <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pseudo-science/>

Scientific Method. (n.d.). <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/scientific-method/>

Stephen John. (2011). EXPERT TESTIMONY AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL FREE-RIDING: THE MMR CONTROVERSY. *The Philosophical Quarterly* (1950-), 61(244).

[https://www.jstor.org/stable/23012979?seq=1#metadata\\_info\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/23012979?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)

Steven M. Cahn, Maureen Eckert, & Robert Buckley. (n.d.). Edmund Gettier, "Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?", chapter of *Knowledge and Reality* (pages 5-7). In *Knowledge and Reality*. Prentice Hall.

Susan Haack. (1993a). (Chapter 1) Foundationalism versus Coherentism: a Dichotomy Disclaimed. In *Evidence and inquiry: towards reconstruction in epistemology*. Blackwell.

Susan Haack. (1993b). (Chapter 1) Foundationalism versus Coherentism: a Dichotomy Disclaimed. In *Evidence and inquiry: towards reconstruction in epistemology*. Blackwell.

Zagzebski, L. (1994). The Inescapability of Gettier Problems. *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 44(174). <https://doi.org/10.2307/2220147>